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This paper examines how the deregulation of the international road transport industry in Western Europe 
has affected 1- the total quantity of cross-border road transport in the region; 2- the degree to which 
shippers outsource rather than integrate vertically their cross-border transport needs; and 3- the extent to 
which different countries participate in international road freight transport in Western Europe. Not 
surprisingly, we find that deregulation has had a large positive effect on the amount of international road 
transport net of the effect of the trade ties that grew over time among European Union countries. 
Moreover, consistent with the fact that the regulation disproportionately affected for-hire trucking, we 
find that deregulation has led shippers to shift toward more for-hire transport as opposed to own-account 
or private haulage. However, despite concerns voiced by member countries, we find no evidence that 
deregulation has disproportionately favored carriers of countries that were initially more (or less) 
intensively involved in international haulage. 
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The deregulation of the interstate trucking industry took place, in the USA, with the 
Motor Carrier Act of 1980, which removed entry barriers and eliminated price-setting bureaus. A 
number of studies have established how this deregulation has led to lower transport prices, 
changes in the organization of labor, and changes in the concentration and organization of the 
industry (e.g. Rose 1985 and 1987, Joskow and Rose, 1989, Winston et al., 1990, Ying and 
Keeler, 1991, Boyer 1993, Peoples and Peteraf, 1995 and 1999). 
At that same time, in the European Union,1 a complex series of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements still governed both the amount of road transport that could be done between 
countries and the prices that could be charged for such transport.2  This was the case despite the 
fact that the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community stated that a 
common transport policy had to be achieved by December 1969. In fact, the deregulation of 
international road transport in the European Union did not begin until the mid-1980s. Moreover 
it was much more gradual than in the USA, having been completed, or at least mostly completed, 
only at the end of the 1990s.  Finally, the stated reasons to deregulate international transport in 
the European Union, and some of the concerns surrounding such deregulation, were different 
from those associated with U.S. deregulation. In particular, instead of emphasizing potential 
efficiency gains, an important motivation for deregulation in the European Union was the desire 
to eliminate government discrimination based on nationality of the freight transport provider. 
Not surprisingly, individual member countries thus worried about potential market share losses 
                                                
1 Prior to 1992 the European Union (EU) was the European Communities, the most important of which was the 
European Economic Community (EEC).  
2 In this study we focus exclusively on international road freight transport as it functions under its own set of rules 
and is the type of haulage affected by the supranational European Union rules. Individual national trucking markets 
within the EU also have historically been regulated and have gone through their own deregulation processes. 
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in deregulated sectors. These differences in stated goals and concerns, in turn, affected the form  
and speed of the deregulation process. 
Due in part to timing and duration of the deregulation, and in part to data issues discussed 
below, the effects of deregulation of the trucking industry in the European Union (EU from now 
on) have not received much attention in the literature.3  This paper begins to fill that gap by 
describing in some detail the process of deregulation that occurred in the EU in the 1980s and 
1990s, and then analyzing how it has affected 1- the total amount of international road transport, 
2- the extent to which shippers outsource their transport needs, and 3- the degree to which 
countries participate in international road transport.  In the USA, studies have explicitly focused 
on the effect of deregulation on pricing.  Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from doing 
the same.  However, our finding that the relaxation of regulations has had a large positive effect 
on the total amount of international road transport, beyond what would be expected due to the 
increased trade among EU countries, suggests that relative to alternative modes of transportation, 
the cost to shippers of relying on road transport have gone down over time as a result of 
deregulation.  In other words, this result is consistent with the lower road transport prices one 
would associate with deregulation.  Contrary to the U.S., where authors have found no evidence 
of change in the extent of private versus for-hire road transport resulting from deregulation, we 
find that deregulation has reduced the tendency of shippers to own and operate their own trucks 
for international transport in the EU. Instead shippers there have turned to firms that specialize in 
freight transport for their shipping needs.  This finding suggests that deregulation has reduced the 
cost of for-hire trucking relative to own account haulage, a finding that is consistent with our 
expectations given that the for-hire segment was much more highly regulated than own-account 
                                                
3 Existing studies on European deregulation of trucking include OECD (1988, 1990), Allen (1990), ECMT (1991, 
2002), , McKinnon (1996), European Commission (1997) and Fernandez et al. (2000). Boylaud (2000) summarizes 
the results of several empirical studies on road freight transportation deregulation worldwide. 
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haulage was.  Finally, despite concerns to this effect, we find no evidence that deregulation has 
affected the degree to which different countries participate or specialize in road transport. 
Carriers of any given country as a group were not disproportionately better or worse off after 
deregulation. 
The paper is organized as follows.  First, we review the general characteristics of the road 
transport market in Europe and how it compares to the USA in the next section. We then 
describe how the European international trucking industry was regulated and the process of 
deregulation in section 3. We present hypotheses concerning the likely effects of deregulation in 
section 4.  Section 5 describes the data that we rely on, while section 6 contains the empirical 
model and results. Concluding remarks are found in section 7. 
 
2. The trucking industry in Europe 
 
The European Union is different from the USA in many ways, some of which are 
admittedly very obvious, but some can usefully be restated. First of all the EU is an association 
of individual countries that do not share a common language, common taxes or common 
business environments. The European Union is a supranational power that oversees international 
transport while each country retains jurisdiction over its own domestic transport (as long as its 
policies do not discriminate by nationality of the carrier).  As a result national and international 
markets obey rules that can be very different. In this paper, we focus explicitly on international – 
or cross-border - road transport. 
In 2001, road transport accounted for 45% of all freight transported among the 15 EU 
member states, measured in ton-kilometers (t-kms).4 Another 7.8% was transported by rail, 4% 
by inland waterways, 2.8% through pipelines and 40.4% by sea. Excluding sea shipping, road 
                                                
4 A ton-kilometer represents one ton (1000 kg) of freight transported for one km. 
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freight haulage is by far the dominant transport mode, with 75.5% of the total t-kms. This 
fraction also has grown significantly since 1980 when it was 60% (EU, 2003).  By comparison, 
within the USA, where geography rules out sea shipping, 32.2% of total t-kms were transported 
by road in 2000, while 41.3% went by rail, 10.2% by inland waterways, and 16.3% through 
pipelines. The much higher reliance on rail in the USA reflects the fact that railways are used 
primarily for long-distance and heavy freight transport.5 
Broadly speaking, two types of firms are involved in road transport: motor carriers, who 
operate in the for-hire sector, providing service in exchange for compensation from shippers, and 
shippers themselves who rely on their own resources to transport their own goods.  Together, the 
latter form what is usually called the private or own-account trucking segment.6  In 1998, the for-
hire trucking industry accounted for 4% of GDP in Europe.  Private haulage (own account) 
added another 1%, so that on the whole the industry accounted for 5% of total GDP (EU, 2000). 
Trucking also accounts for about 5% of GDP in the USA. The split between own-account and 
for-hire is quite different, however, with the own-account sector in the USA taking up about 50% 
of total t-kms (Hubbard, 1998). 
In the European Union, about 30% of national road transport (i.e. within country) t-kms 
are transported via own-account haulage. This falls to 10% for international – or cross-border – 
haulage.  For large countries such as France, international road freight transport is a fairly small 
percentage of total freight transported by road (national + international), accounting for about 
14% in 1982 and growing to 20% by the end of the 1990s.  For smaller countries, which also 
tend to be more centrally located countries, such as Belgium, the percentage was as high as 65% 
                                                
5 In particular, when the shares are measured in terms of revenues rather than t-kms, the share of rail is much lower 
in the USA. Reliable data based on revenues are not available for Europe. 
6 In the USA, this is usually called private haulage while in Europe, it is more standard to refer to this as own 
account.  In Europe, own-account transport was originally defined in the 1957 resolution of the ECMT (European 
Council of the Ministers of Transport). See Appendix A for details. 
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at the beginning of the 1980s and reached about 70% by 1998. Not surprisingly, islands such as 
the UK and Ireland have a very small percentage of international road freight transport. 
3. Regulation and deregulation of international road transport in Europe 
 
To appreciate the basic characteristics of international road transport regulation and 
deregulation in Europe, it is useful to recognize that, as stated earlier, the EU has jurisdiction 
only over the international component of the European road transport market.  Each country still 
can set its own rules for transport that begins and ends within its borders.  Second, as in the USA, 
regulations in this market have been imposed on both entry and price.  Not every European 
country regulated both the prices at which shipments could take place and the number of licenses 
that were available to carriers for international transport, but most of them did one or the other. 
Third, and lastly, during periods of heavy regulation the own-account sector was relatively 
unregulated. However now that the for-hire sector has been mostly liberalized, the continuing 
regulations on the own-account transport make it the most regulated segment of the industry. 
Specifically, throughout the period covered by this study and to this day, transporters for own-
account were not allowed to carry third-party freight generally, and for-hire backhauls 
specifically, defined as hauls that take the carrier back to the country of origin but that do not 
involve the carrier’s own goods. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, for-hire road haulage between EU member states was 
authorized in one of four ways: 
1. Under bilateral agreements between member states.  These agreements either allowed 
free movement of goods or imposed quotas on the number of movements.  If a journey 
involved transit through a third country, then a permit might be needed from that country 
7
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as well.7  Under these bilateral agreements, the transport permit granted to a carrier could 
be limited to a certain period or a certain number of journeys.8 Bilateral agreements 
applied to both the for-hire and the own-account sector (Bernadet 1997 and Scharf and 
Smolders 1999) until 1980 (see point 2) and thereafter only to the for-hire sector. These 
permits were the norm for all international European transport (within and outside of the 
EU) until the late 1980s. From the mid 1990s onward, they were only needed for 
transport outside of the EU, and they have remained the norm for transport to and from 
Eastern European countries. Note that the European Union had only nominal control over 
bilateral agreements between member states.9 
2. Under Community permits.  These permits, or quota arrangements, were instituted in 
1969, and allowed a limited number of vehicles to operate freely within the 
Community.10  Each country was allocated a quota and decided how to distribute it 
among its national motor carriers. The permits allowed unlimited international journeys 
during one year.  However, until the late 80s they accounted for only about 5% of 
international road transport (Whitelegg, 1988; Bernadet, 1997 and Degli Abbati, 1987). 
The first two tables in Appendix B show how the number of community quota 
authorizations changed between 1969 and 1992.  By 1993, the for-hire segment was 
deregulated in that limitations on the number of these permits were lifted.  Own-account 
                                                
7 Usually bilateral agreements included the authorization to transit through a third country. Sometimes however third 
countries did not recognize transit authorizations in which case a specific permission to transit had to be obtained 
from such third countries or separate bilateral agreements could be established with the third country. 
8 Specifically, there were two types of authorization: authorization by trip and authorization by time. The trip 
authorizations allowed a predetermined number of trips to be completed in a specified time-period.  The time 
authorizations were valid for a year and covered an indeterminate amount of trips within that time. Typically such 
agreements were negotiated by the countries’ governments every year. Each government then distributed these 
authorizations among its carriers however it saw fit. 
9 See Council Decision 80/48/EEC of 20 December 1979 on the adjustment of capacity of carriage of goods by road 
for hire between member states (OJ L 18 24/1/1980). 
10 Council Regulation N. 1018/68 published in the OJ L 175 of 23/7/1968. The initial quota was for a total of 1200 
authorizations and covered only for-hire carriers. For extensions of this regulation, see degli Abbati (1987) pp 105-
106. 
8
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 51 [2005]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art51
 8 
transport within the EU, in contrast, was declared free of quota or authorization 
requirements in 1980.11 
3. Under European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT) quota arrangements.  
These quotas are similar to Community quotas but apply to most ECMT countries.12 
These permits are available only for the for-hire transport sector, and are quite limited in 
number. In 1994 the total number of such authorizations was 4100, less than the amount 
that was available in 1973 to the (then) nine member of the EU. They are currently – and 
were throughout the period of this study - mostly used for transit from European 
Community countries to non-EU countries rather than within the EU.  
4. For types of transport exempt from quotas. This was the case in particular for goods that 
traveled in part by rail, for some exempt commodities 13 and for transport with 
Switzerland, Andorra, Monaco and Lichtenstein, countries that are part of the ECMT, but 
not the EU, and that completely liberalized access of freight carriers to their territory 
prior to the start of our data period. This also applied to all trucks with a payload weight 
smaller than or equal to 3.5 tons. Moreover all for-hire transport within 25 km on either 
                                                
11 Council Directive 80/49/EEC published in OJ L 18 24/1/1980, amended by Council Regulation 881/92 published 
in the OJ L 095 of 09/04/1992. However the definition of own-account transport is somewhat restrictive in that it 
allows own-account transport only for vehicles driven by employees of the transporting firm. This does not allow 
own-account firms to rent trucks and drivers, for example, or to make use of a temporary driver. See Appendix A. 
12 The ECMT is an inter-governmental organization established in 1953, that constitutes a forum for the Ministers of 
Transport of various European countries, not limited to EU members. Until the end of the 1980s it included EU 
members, EFTA members (Switzerland, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Austria) plus Yugoslavia and Turkey. 
Eastern and Central European countries joined after the end of the communist block and currently the ECMT has 43 
members including the 15 members of the EU. These multilateral authorizations are valid in all the member 
countries of the ECMT and include transit permits. They are yearly authorizations, but each country can decide to 
divide an authorization in 12 monthly authorizations. Since these authorizations are only available for the for-hire 
segment, outside of the EU own-account transport still can only be performed under bilateral agreements. 
13 Exempt commodities are (from Council Regulation n 881/92, published in the OJ L 095 of 09/04/92): 
• Carriage of mail as a public service 
• Carriage of vehicles which have suffered damage or breakdown 
• Carriage of goods in motor vehicles the permissible laden weight of which, including that of trailers, does not 
exceed six tons or the permissible payload of which, including that of trailers, does not exceed 3.5 tons. 
• Carriage of goods by own account 
• Carriage of medicinal products, appliances, equipment and other articles required for medical care in emergency 
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side of a border as the crow flies has been exempt from any authorization or quota 
requirement.14 
In addition to these quotas or ‘entry’ regulations, carriers involved in international road 
transport also faced pricing restrictions. Bilateral agreements between member states typically 
specified price-brackets (that is a minimum and a maximum price) at which transactions could 
occur. These price brackets officially became ‘suggested’ prices in 1984, but member states 
could choose to maintain compulsory rates.15  In January 1990, prices were allowed to be set 
through market negotiation between the shipper and the carrier. However, even when these price 
brackets were officially binding, they never appear to have been enforced (Bayliss and Coleman, 
1994 and Degli Abbati, 1987 p. 98).  For that reason, our analyses below focus on the relaxation 
of quotas or entry requirements rather than changes in price regulation. 
Carriers involved in international road transport between EU members faced a number of 
other regulatory constraints that were relaxed during the 1980s and 1990s. First, there were 
lengthy controls at borders up until 1990 when these were eliminated.  Second, carriers faced 
very strict restrictions on cross-trade transport and a complete prohibition on cabotage. Cross-
trade transport is defined as international road transport performed by a motor vehicle registered 
in a third country.  Such transport was only authorized under Community quotas.  As the 
availability of such quotas increased, the restrictions on cross-trade transport became less 
stringent.  Cabotage, on the other hand, is defined as transport within a member state that is 
performed by a carrier registered in a different country.  The prohibition against cabotage was 
lifted gradually, as discussed below.   
                                                
14 See First council directive of 23 July 1962 on the establishment of certain common rules for international 
transport published in the OJ 70, 6/8/1962 and all successive amendments. 
15 Council Regulation N. 3568/83 published in the OJ L 359, 22/12/1983. 
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This set of rules concerning who could carry what where existed despite the fact that 
discrimination based on the nationality of the carrier was supposed to be illegal among EU 
member countries.  Indeed, the 1957 Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic 
Community stated that a common transport policy had to be achieved by December 1969. This 
was still not the case in the early 80s, so in 1985 the Court of Justice ruled that member states 
had to enact legislation in order to achieve a free international market for road freight transport. 
Following this ruling a progressive liberalization started taking place. In 1987, the number of 
community permits was greatly increased: specifically, the number of Community authorizations 
increased by 40% each year between 1987 and 1992.16 All limitations on the number of permits 
were eliminated in 1993 with the introduction of Community licenses, which are 5-year 
renewable licenses allowing a carrier to transport anywhere within the EU.  The increase in 
Community authorizations for international road transport and the creation of Community 
licenses also implicitly relaxed and then lifted all regulations regarding cross-trade transport.  
Later in 1990, as noted above, controls at borders within the European Union were 
eliminated, cutting down times for international road transport.17 Also, in July 1990, a limited 
number of permits to perform cabotage operations were introduced which were restricted to for-
hire carriers only. Specifically, between July 1990 and July 1991 the EU created 15,000 
authorizations (equivalent to 2,500 yearly permits).18 This number was increased by 10% in 
1991-1992 and another 10% in 1992-1993. The final solution to the cabotage issue was adopted 
with EU regulation 3118/93 which stated that starting on January 1, 1994 the number of cabotage 
                                                
16 50% of the additional permits each year were allocated ‘linearly’, that is in proportion to the total number of 
permits that a country detained the previous year, and the remaining 50% were allocated based on the effective 
utilization rates of permits in each country (Bernadet, 1997). See Appendix B for details. 
17 Arguably this could have pushed towards greater intra-European trade as firms restructured and centralized their 
production activities. We discuss this further below. 
18 EU regulation 4059/89 authorized cabotage for the for-hire transport sector starting in July 1990.  Cabotage 
authorizations could only be assigned to motor carriers that had a community authorization for international 
transport. It was valid for two months (but could be divided into two authorizations of one month each). It could be 
used by any vehicle owned by the transport company.  
11
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authorizations were to be increased systematically until July 1, 1998 when the need for cabotage 
authorizations would be eliminated.19 Note that in 1994, EU regulation 792/94 also authorized 
own-account carriers to perform cabotage operations.  Prior to that date, own-account continued 
to face a complete prohibition on cabotage.  This was the only area where own-account faced 
more stringent rules than did the for-hire segment.  
During this same time period, there were few changes in the regulation of other modes of 
international transport in the EU.  Rail freight transport remained fairly heavily regulated 
throughout the period of this study though legislation enacted in the 1990s set the ground rules 
for a slow liberalization to occur in the rail freight industry starting in March 2003.  Seaports 
were neglected by EU policy during the 1970s and 1980s.  In the early 1990s investments in 
ports increased significantly.  Also, the amount of freight transported through inland waterways 
did not substantially change during the 80s and 90s although the adoption of containerization 
allowed this mode of transport to become much more efficient and to considerably reduce the 
number of vessels used.   
4. Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
 
4.1.  Liberalization and the Amount of International Road Transport 
 
Prior to liberalization the regulatory regime imposed high costs on the transport of goods 
across borders by road, both because of the need to secure permits and because of time-
consuming border controls.  This likely led carriers to make detours, add inefficient hauls, 
perhaps refuse certain hauls (for example hauls that did not originate or end in the country where 
the carrier was registered), and so on. In fact, largely due to the various constraints imposed by 
                                                
19 In order to take into account the fact that new members had entered the EU, EU regulation 792/94 further 
increased cabotage authorizations by 54% for 1995 and another 30% per year until July 1, 1998 when the need for 
cabotage authorizations was eliminated.  For the exact number of authorizations over time, see appendix B. 
12
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the regulatory regime, about 40% of the trucks crossing borders were traveling empty in the EU 
during the late 1980s.20 
To the extent that liberalization, be it the growth in the number of authorizations or the 
liberalization of cabotage and cross-trade transport, has allowed carriers to combine loads more 
efficiently, or to use more direct or otherwise better routing, it should reduce the cost of 
international road transport relative to local road trucking and to other modes of freight 
transportation. Assuming that these reduced costs are passed on to consumers in the form of 
lower prices, deregulation will lead to significant growth in international road transport due to its 
lower relative price.21 
4.2.  Liberalization and the Use of For-Hire versus Own-Account Carriage 
The choice between for-hire and own-account haulage for a shipper involves a number of 
trade-offs.  Shippers whose loads need to be highly coordinated with production needs or whose 
customer service requirements are high may tend to use own account haulage (Hubbard, 2001, 
Baker and Hubbard, 2003, Nickerson and Silverman, 2003).  For-hire carriage, however, will 
typically be more cost efficient.  Specifically, for-hire carriers are better able to maintain high 
loading factors for their trucks and reduce the trucks’ idle time (thereby reducing their unit cost) 
for a number of reasons. First, for-hire firms tend to be less sensitive to demand volatility 
because they serve the transportation needs of a portfolio of firms.  Second, in the period under 
study in Europe, private carriers were not allowed to take on third-party freight. Finally, even 
                                                
20 This is a very large amount compared to the US. Moore (1991) reports that prior to deregulation 28% of own 
account carriers in the US had empty backhauls. The amount of empty backhauls for for-hire carriers is typically 
lower because they are better able to secure backhauls. 
21 Lower transportation costs also might increase the incentives of companies to source or sell more internationally, 
thereby increasing the amount of international trade.  We do not believe this potential endogeneity problem should 
affect how we interpret our results for two main reasons.  First, the impact of lower international transport costs on 
the amount of international trade is likely to be negligible compared to the overall effect of EU enlargement and of 
the push towards a single European market. Second, in our empirical analyses, we examine the effects of 
deregulation after controlling for changes in international trade. If lower international road freight transport costs 
spurred increases in international trade, our results will be biased against our finding a direct deregulation effect.  
13
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when private carriers can take on third-party freight, for-hire firms are better able to identify and 
coordinate complementary demands. In order to find hauls and backhauls a carrier has to build 
expertise in the market and a web of potential shippers (see e.g. Baker and Hubbard, 2003). A 
firm whose primary activities lies outside of trucking is less likely to be successful at regularly 
identifying and pricing good matches for its hauls. Private carriers will therefore end up typically 
with a higher percentage of empty backhauls.   
While the decision to outsource transportation needs depends on a number of factors, 
liberalization has only affected specific aspects of this equation. Prior to the period of our study, 
in the 1960s and 1970s, both own-account and for-hire carriers were subject to the same permit 
requirements. In the early 1980s, however, a Council directive exempted own-account transport 
from any quota or authorization requirement. Consequently, the increased availability of 
community licenses that occurred through liberalization in the 1980s had an impact only on the 
for-hire segment, reducing its cost relative to the already liberalized private haulage.  These 
lower costs, assuming they were passed on to consumers of road transport in the form of lower 
prices, should make the ‘buy’ option relatively more attractive to shippers. We therefore expect 
licensing deregulation, which occurred throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, to increase the 
proportion of international road transport performed by for-hire carriers. 
Another aspect of deregulation that may affect the relative reliance on for-hire and 
private haulage relates to cabotage. Changes in regulation for cabotage were implemented 
initially for for-hire haulage only, and then for own-account haulage. If such regulations were 
constraining, and the amount of deregulation economically significant, one would expect the 
deregulation to have a positive effect on the proportion of for-hire during the period of 
preferential treatment (1991-1994). 
14
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 51 [2005]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art51
 14 
4.3.  The Effect of Liberalization on Member State Transport Intensity 
 
National governments in Europe are often concerned that changes in regulation will go to 
the advantage of other countries. In the case of international road freight transport deregulation, 
there were two major concerns. First of all, large countries that had been strictly regulated, such 
as France and Germany, were afraid that deregulation would favor carriers of countries that were 
more open, such as the Netherlands and Belgium. Second, they were concerned that large 
amounts of international trucking would be captured by carriers of countries with low labor 
costs, such as Portugal and Spain.22 
Prior to liberalization the distribution of international road transport activities across 
member countries was determined predominantly by each country’s set of bilateral agreements.  
This gave an advantage to transporters registered in countries with more extensive sets of 
agreements.23 They could provide a larger amount of international transport services relative to 
trucking companies in countries with fewer agreements.   
As deregulation progressed, two opposing forces affected the distribution of road 
transport activities across countries. On the one hand, carriers from countries that were operating 
under a more liberalized regime – i.e. with more bilateral agreements - prior to liberalization may 
have been more efficient and therefore in better position to take advantage of the deregulated 
environment.  On the other hand, deregulation reduced the importance of a transporter’s country 
of origin in securing freight, allowing carriers of countries with originally fewer agreements to 
take advantage of the deregulated environment.  Depending on which of these effects dominated, 
deregulation may have led to an increase or decrease in the transport intensity of those countries 
that were responsible for a disproportionately high share of international road transport within 
                                                
22 Such fears are not limited to the EU: e.g., see ECMT (2002). 
23 Of course, it is also true that countries with more or larger registered road transporters potentially had greater 
incentives to negotiate more agreements.  Thus the advantage of country of origin could be self-sustaining. 
15
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the EU prior to deregulation. We explore this question and the effect of labor cost differentials 
empirically below. 
5. The Data  
 
We obtained the road transport data mostly from Eurostat, the European statistical 
institute. The information on t-kms transported is a harmonized collection of observations from 
each EU country each year, spanning the 1982-2002 period.24 Typically the information is for 
trucks with a payload weight of more than 3.5 tons.25  We complemented and corrected the data 
using the ECMT database.26  The data include information on the amount of international 
haulage performed by carriers of the reporting countries (in thousand million t-kms).27 Neither t-
kms transported under the cabotage regime (available after 1991) or cross-trade transport are 
included in these figures, and we do not analyze the amount of such transport either, as the data 
on these were not collected reliably prior to 1999.28  Finally, the data distinguish t-kms 
transported by for-hire and by own-account operators. 
The data include information for all countries that are members of the EU during the 
1982 to 2002 period. In 1982 there were ten member countries; that number had grown to 15 by 
1995.29  Since an important part of the deregulation process ended in 1993, the empirical 
analyses below focus on the 12 countries that joined the EU prior to 1990, namely Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
                                                
24 Prior to 1999 the data were based in part on customs data. In 1999, data collection at borders was dismantled, so 
the data since then have been collected through surveys. 
25 Exact information on the parameters used by each country is not available. 
26Specifically, when data appeared extremely different in adjacent years, I compared with the ECMT data and used 
the latter if they seemed more plausible. 
27 The data on inbound (from a foreign country to the declaring country) and outbound (from the declaring country 
to a foreign country) carriage were added together to obtain total t-kms per country 
28 We have verified, however, that our results are the same if we use the total amount of t-kms transported, including 
cabotage and cross-trade transport, as our dependent variable. For more on the data problems with these, see the 
methodological notes in EU (2004).  
29 See appendix C for a short history of the enlargement of the EU. 
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Spain and the UK.  In what follows, however, Belgium and Luxembourg are considered a single 
jurisdiction: the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union.  
To control for the increased trade among EU members, we obtained data on international 
trade flows from the IMF Direction of Trade database. For each country we measure total EU 
trade, namely trade (imports plus exports) with countries that are part of the EU at any given 
time. This variable captures the increased trade due to German reunification as well as 
enlargement in addition to increased trade among those countries that are already members of the 
EU.  Because the transport data are measured in real terms (t-kms), we converted the trade data 
to 1990 US dollars.30 Finally, we control for the price of inputs in some of our analyses.  We use 
the price of diesel fuel including all taxes and expressed in real – as opposed to nominal - ECUs 
(European Currency Units) for that purpose.31   
For most of the nine countries32 that were part of the EU prior to 1982, there are 21 
observations available.33 Spain and Portugal joined the EU in 1986, so there are 17 observations 
for these. The price of diesel (by country) is available starting in 1985, so the time series is a bit 
shorter (18 observations per country). 
As for the measurement of deregulation, we show in Appendix B the number of EU 
permits for road transport assigned to carriers, by carriers’ country of origin, and the number of 
cabotage permits as well, during the period of analysis. Since there are no EU permits issued 
after 1993, when entry into international road transport was fully deregulated, we cannot tell how 
many authorizations full deregulation corresponds to. As a result, any measure of deregulation 
                                                
30 They are in current US dollars in the source.  We first converted them to national currency, then deflated the 
figures for each country with the appropriate price deflator, and finally reconverted them to US dollars using the 
exchange rate for 1990. 
31 The fuel price data was originally in nominal terms, and by semester.  We use the average of the semester data 
each year as our annual measure, and deflate these using a CPI deflator. 
32 For simplicity, we refer to countries in what follows even though one of the jurisdictions is actually an economic 
union of two countries: Belgium and Luxembourg. 
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will be somewhat arbitrary. For this reason, in much of what follows, we use a simple step 
function, setting the authorization deregulation variable equal to 0 for all years prior to 1985 
(complete regulation), to 0.5 between 1985 and 1993 (partial deregulation), and 1 after 1993 
(complete deregulation). Similarly, we define a cabotage deregulation variable equal to 0 prior to 
1990 (when none was allowed), 0.5 between 1990 and 1998 (limited availability of 
authorizations) and 1 starting in 1998 (when it was completely liberalized). One way to think 
about these measures is that they capture the level of information available or relevant to market 
participants.  Specifically, individuals and firms may be able to tell when the market is fully 
regulated, partially deregulated, and fully deregulated, but may not know or associate the exact 
number of EU permits in their countries with an exact “degree” of deregulation at any given 
time.  Note that these variables also implicitly assume that the degree of deregulation is the same 
across countries at any given point in time.  While this is not strictly correct (see below), 
differences in rates of deregulation were minimal.  This, in turn, limits the empirical strategies 
open to us.34 
To see the results we might obtain with a more “precise” measure, however, we also used 
a deregulation variable that we set equal to zero prior to deregulation and 100 from 1993 (or 
1998 for cabotage) onward. Between those two periods, we calculate the extent of deregulation 
using the number of authorizations allocated to each country each year in proportion to what we 
expect total deregulation to require. We assume specifically that the market is 90% deregulated 
by the last year of partial deregulation (1992 for international authorizations and 1997 for 
cabotage). This assumption seems reasonable given the observed growth in international 
transport after full deregulation. This assumption then allows us to calculate the required number 
of authorizations that would correspond to full deregulation at the time it was implemented as 
                                                
34 In particular, we cannot rely on a difference-in-difference estimation strategy.  Instead, we try to provide more 
descriptive evidence to strengthen our arguments, along with a number of robustness tests. 
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Nc* = (100/90) Nc, where Nc stands for the number of authorizations available for that country 
the last year of partial deregulation. The degree of deregulation in year t for country c is then 
calculated as (xct /Nc*) 100, where xct is the number of licenses available to country c in year t.  
This variable allows us not only to capture the extent of deregulation overall on a more 
continuous basis, but it also captures the fact that the level of deregulation was not exactly the 
same across countries at any given time. 
Border deregulation is measured as a single dummy variable set equal to zero prior to 
1990 and one thereafter.  We report summary statistics for all these variables in Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary statistics (country-level data, years 1982-2002) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Road total 
ton-kms (millions) 206 16,280.58 12,035.04 409 51,160 
Ton-kms road x 100 
/ton-kms all modes 153 72.51 22.15 28.94 100 
International ton-kms x 100 
/(nat.+ internat. ton-kms) 203 27.43 17.56 3.37 60.73 
Percent for-hire 206 92.82    6.87  66.31 100 
All modes total ton-kms 
(millions) * 153 30,397.48    25,479.29   660 104,694 
National ton-kms (millions)** 205 64,921.27 62,605.49 3,726 230,016 
Trade (billion US $) 223 165.81    130.1    10.52    571.76 
Diesel price 196 525.77    131.34         212.93 959.99 
Notes: Ton-kms in the table always refer to international ton-kms, unless explicitly noted. 
*: Includes international transport by road, rail and inland waterways. Note that Denmark is missing 
9 observations, Spain, 5, France, 6, Greece, 4, Ireland, all, Italy, 11, Portugal, 2, and the UK, 12. 
**:  Missing observations for national road transport: Italy, 7 observations, Portugal and Spain, one 
observation each, Greece, 4, and Ireland, 5 observations. 
 
6. Specification and results 
6.1. Effects of deregulation on quantity of international road transport  
 
Figure 1 shows how total international road transport changed between 1982 and 2002 
for the six countries for which we have full time series data, namely BLEU (Belgium-
Luxembourg Economic Union), Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the United 
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Kingdom. These six countries were members of the EU throughout the data period, and are also 
the ones with the most reliable data collection systems. These six countries accounted for about 
95% of total international t-kms in the early 1980s. This proportion decreased somewhat over 
time as more countries joined the EU. It stood at about 75% of total international road t-kms in 
the late 1990s.  
Figure 1 shows that the growth in international road transport has been strong throughout 
the liberalization period, for both small and large countries.  Interestingly, the growth in other 
modes of transport was much more modest during the same period, despite being influenced by 
the same expansion in trade (see EU 1999 and 2000).  This implies an increased reliance on 
international trucking in the EU relative to the other modes of transportation. We explore 
whether and how the different types of deregulation may have contributed to this by estimating 
the following regression equation: 
! 
Tct ="c +# authorizationsct + $ cabotagect + % borderderegt + µ tradect +
+& dieselpricect + 'ct
  (1) 
where the dependent variable is international transport by road performed by carriers of country 
c in year t. Assuming that all three forms of regulation were binding, we expect all three 
deregulation variables, borderdereg, authorizations, and cabotage, to have positive effects on 
international road transport. As for our control variables, we expect each country’s level of 
international trade with other EU members to be positively associated with international road 
transport.35 The average yearly price of diesel (by country), on the other hand, increases 
operating costs in road transport.  If this effect is high for road transport relative to other modes, 
then increased fuel prices should reduce the amount of international road transport. 
                                                
35 Of course less expensive road transport, due to deregulation, may also lead to increased trade.  By controlling for 
trade, however, we can assess if deregulation has had a direct effect on road transport net of this effect on trade. 
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Table 2 shows the results from estimating equation (1) with country fixed effects, i.e. 
assuming that εct = ec + µct, as we need to control for the time-invariant, unobserved 
characteristics of each country.36  The first two columns show results obtained with all available 
data for the 11 countries that joined the EU prior to 1995.  In the first of these results are 
obtained using our more continuous “proportion” deregulation variables, whereas the second 
column shows results from our step variable measures of deregulation. The next two columns 
show results obtained for the sub-sample of six countries for which we have complete time-series 
data, using the same two ways to measure deregulation. 
Table 2. Country-level. Dependent variable: total ton-kilometers 
 11 Countries*  6 Countries 
 “Proportion” 
Deregulation 
Step Variables  “Proportion” 
Deregulation 
Step Variables 



















































Observations** 182 182  108 108 
R-squared 0.61 0.61  0.76 0.76 
Standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
*: The 11 country regressions include Greece, although total t-kms for Greece is set equal to for-hire t-kms 
because Greece never reports own-account information 
**: Since diesel price is only available after 1985, the sample size is reduced by 24 for the 11-country set and by 
18 fewer for the 6-country regressions. 
 
Though magnitudes and significance levels differ, the results are quite consistent overall. 
Most importantly, we find that the liberalization of the authorization system has had the expected 
                                                
36 As the deregulation variables do not vary significantly (or at all in the case of step variables) by country, there is 
no real “between” estimator for our coefficients of interest, and thus no basis for a “random” effects estimator that 
would be different from the fixed-effects estimator. 
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positive effect on the total amount of t-kms, and this even after we control for increased trade by 
country within the EU. The effect of the liberalization of licenses is quite large, at more than 
4000 (6000) million ton-kms, on average, when we go from 0 to 100% deregulation for the 11 
(6) countries in our sample. Note that, from table 1, the mean for total international t-kms 
transported by road is 16,281 million. The effect of the cabotage variable is generally positive, 
but statistically significant only for the 11-country set when the deregulation variable is 
measured on a proportional basis. The lack of significant effect is not so surprising considering 
that the amount of cabotage remained quite low even when permits became available (Allen, 
2000 and Commission of the European Communities, 2000). Border deregulation also has the 
expected positive effect on the amount of international road transport, but this effect is not robust 
across our specifications.37 The price of diesel has the expected negative effect on the total 
amount of international road transport, though this effect is not measured with enough precision 
to be statistically different from zero. 
Table 3 shows results obtained when we control for increased trade in alternative ways. 
Specifically, we now define the dependent variable as either the percent of international road 
trato the sum of national and international road freight transport (columns 1 through 4), or the 
percent of road t-kms to total t-kms transported by road, rail and inland waterways (columns 5 
and 6). Because we have limited data on transport via other modes, we present results for our 
larger unbalanced sample only for the latter. Also, since we do not expect that diesel prices 
would affect national and international road transport differently, we eliminate this variable from 
the first four regressions, allowing us to increase our sample sizes somewhat.   
                                                
37 The results suggest that this may be due to a spurious interaction between our deregulation variables. For 
example, if we exclude the cabotage deregulation variable from our regressions in Tables 2 and 3, the explanatory 
power of the regressions is unaffected and the coefficients of the other two deregulation variables become more 
positive. Hence, overall, the results imply a positive effect of deregulation in all our regressions – we simply cannot 
disentangle the effects of the various types of deregulation as clearly as one would like. 
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Results in columns 1 through 4 imply that the international road transport sector has 
grown relative to national road transport as international-specific changes in regulation have 
been implemented. Specifically, though the effects of our deregulation variables are not all 
individually significant, taken together our evidence suggests that the proportion of international 
to total national and international transport has grown by about 5 to 6 percentage points - per the 
sum of the coefficients for the deregulation variables - as the different types of deregulation were 
implemented in our larger set of countries.  If we focus on the 6 countries with more complete 
data, we find much stronger effects and our regressors explain much more of the variation in the 
dependent variable, confirming that the 11 country data is quite noisy. Note that during this 
period of time, many individual countries were also deregulating their domestic road freight 
sectors.  This, however, happened at different times and in different ways in the various 
jurisdictions. Our finding that international road freight transport has grown relative to national 
road freight transport during this period suggests that factors influencing the amount of 
international transport went beyond those that influenced national road transport – which include 
trade and GDP growth. Our interpretation is that, as it was subject to especially heavy regulation, 
international road transport was disproportionately affected by its own, EU-level, deregulation.  
Note that the coefficient on trade is negative in these regressions. Though not always statistically 
different from zero, this negative coefficient suggests that national road transport has grown 
more rapidly than international road transport has as a result of increased trade.  
There is limited information on the amount of international freight transported by modes 
other than road. Ireland, for example, lacks the information completely.  Consequently, analyses 
shown in columns 5 and 6, where the dependent variable is the ratio of international road freight 
transport to total international freight across all modes, is carried out on ten rather than eleven 
countries. We include the price of diesel among the regressors in these analyses because road 
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freight transport potentially consumes more fuel per ton-km than rail or inland waterways. 
However, we find that the price of diesel really has no effect on the share of international road 
freight transport versus other modes. Trade, on the other hand, has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on this share, suggesting that road transport has been chosen for an increasing 
portion of the total international transport resulting from the process of growth and integration of 
the EU.  Simplifying border crossing also seems to have increased the share of total international 
transport that is accounted for by road transport. Most importantly, the deregulation of 
authorizations has had a positive and statistically significant effect on the extent to which 
shippers rely on international road transport relative to other modes:  the percent of international 
road transport, relative to all modes, increases by 3.6 or 5.6 percentage points, depending on 
which deregulation measure we use, when the deregulation of licenses goes from 0 to 1.38 
 
Table 3. Country level: Alternative dependent variables. 
 100 * Total International Road /  
Total National + Int’l Road 
 100 * Total Road/ 
Total All Modes 
 11 Countries* 6 Countries  10 Countries* 





















































































Observations 203 203 126 126  135 135 
                                                
38 This result is robust to changes in specification, in particular to allowing the authorizations deregulation variable 
to have a different coefficient for each country. 
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R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.39 0.43  0.43 0.43 
Standard errors in parentheses;  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
 
6.2. Effects on percent of total transport operated by for-hire carriers 
 
Figure 2 displays the evolution of the for-hire share of total international freight trucking 
for the six European countries for which we have complete time series data between 1982 and 
2002.  It shows that the share of for-hire trucking has increased in all six countries during this 
period, and especially in the Belgium-Luxembourg union which started from the lowest share of 
for-hire transport.  We explore whether deregulation contributed to this change by estimating the 
following: 
cttctcct mmycabotageduionsauthorizatforhire !"#$ +++=%   (2) 
where %forhire stands for the percent of total ton-kilometers transported by for-hire carriers in 
country c at time t.  As before, the variable authorizations captures the deregulation of the 
system of licenses for international road transport.  The variable cabotagedummy replaces our 
earlier cabotage deregulation variable because what matters in equation (2) is not the number of 
licenses for cabotage and how it has changed over time, but rather the fact that for-hire trucking 
received preferential treatment – albeit to a limited extent - with respect to cabotage between 
1991 and 1994.  Thus cabotagedummy is set equal to 1 for the period 1991 to 1994 and is 0 
otherwise. As there are no reasons to expect international trade or the price of diesel to influence 
the decision to outsource trucking services, these control variables are excluded from the current 
analyses.39 The ‘full sample’ results are limited to 10 countries because Greece never reports the 
amount of international own account road freight transport performed. 
                                                
39 There have been several studies in recent years (notably Hubbard, 2000 and Baker and Hubbard, 2003) that 
analyze the effects of on-board-computers on the make or buy decision in the trucking industry in the US market. 
Representatives of the European trucking industry were unanimous in regarding this as a non-issue in Europe 
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Results from estimating equation (2) with country-level fixed effects are shown in table 
4. They imply that increasing the number of licenses has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on the share of total transport operated by for-hire firms. Specifically, on average, moving 
from complete regulation to complete deregulation increased the percentage of for-hire transport 
from almost 7 to 9 percentage points.  Moreover, consistent with earlier results, which suggested 
that cabotage was never a major issue or opportunity, the preferential treatment of for-hire in the 
cabotage liberalization process seems to have had – if anything – a negative effect on shippers’ 
decision to integrate vertically or subcontract their transportation needs. Most likely the negative 
effect is due to some other concurrent change in the market – for our purposes, however, it 
mostly implies a lack of advantage associated with the short preferential treatment of the for-hire 
segment for cabotage.40  
Note that the results are robust to our different measures of deregulation and do not vary 
significantly between the full and balanced panel data. 
Table 4.  Dependent variable: % for-hire 
 10 Countries  6 Countries 


































Observations 189 189  126 126 
R-squared 0.35 0.36  0.54 0.48 
Standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
                                                                                                                                                       
because there is very limited adoption of computers that go beyond what is mandated everywhere by law (trip 
recorders). We therefore do not consider any measure of adoption of on-board-computers in our analysis. 
40 For example, the use of just-in-time production processes grew during the period of our sample.  If this increased 
the coordination needs of shippers, it might be expected to increase their desire to vertically integrate their 
transportation functions. The fact that we find the opposite trend in our raw data suggests that the liberalization of 
international transport rules had an even larger effect. 
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6.3. Effects on member state transport intensity 
 
National governments in Europe are often concerned that changes to the status quo will 
go to the advantage of other countries. This prompted us to look at the effects of deregulation on 
the specialization of member states in international transport. Specifically, we are interested in 
the extent to which deregulation may have affected how much different member states may 
“disproportionately” participate in international transport.  We do this by first generating the 











     (3) 
  
where Tct represents the amount of international road transport in ton-kilometers of the carriers 
of country c in year t, and GDP is Gross Domestic Product. This measure captures the degree to 
which a particular country ‘specializes’ in international road transport, that is the extent to which 
its share of international road transport diverges from its share of European GDP. We are 
interested in determining if the countries that are initially more specialized in international road 
freight transport specialize even more in this activity after deregulation. Also we want to explore 
if carriers of low-wage countries such as Spain, Portugal and Italy ended up with a much larger 
share of total international transport after deregulation. 
Figure 3 shows the share of total international road transport accounted for by each of the 
six countries for which we have full time series with respect to the total amount of international 
road freight transport for those countries.  Figure 4, in turn, shows how the intensity variable 
defined above has changed over time for these same countries.  Neither graph suggests a clear 
effect of deregulation on the tendency for different countries to specialize more in, or get a larger 
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share of, international road transport in Europe.  Neither those with larger shares nor smaller 
shares before deregulation seem to gain disproportionately from the change.   Instead, we see 
individual countries such as Germany lose share, but then regain it later; and the UK gains share 
in the mid-80s, but then starts losing it later on. The variability of our intensity index is larger for 
some countries, but the three countries with ratios below one – which means the three countries 
that do less international road transport than their GDP might “warrant” - remain there the whole 
time, and the three countries with ratios above one – which are all small countries through which 
much traffic must go - remain there over the full period as well, albeit with a degree of 
fluctuation in “intensity.” Regression results (not shown), where we allow deregulation to affect 
high and low intensity countries differently - simply confirm that among the six countries for 
which we have full time series, deregulation has had basically no effect on their “degree of 
specialization” in international road transport. 
We also address the fear that carriers of low-wage countries would take advantage of the 
deregulated environment: figure 5 shows the share of total international road freight transport 
performed by carriers of low-wage countries, i.e. Italy, Portugal and Spain. Carriers of these 
countries do not appear to have increased their share of total international transport dramatically. 
In fact the largest increase is for carriers located in Spain, but only for the later years of the 
sample when the wage differential with other European countries was in fact decreasing. 
To explore the concern about industry distribution in a different way, we show in Table 5 
how the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) of concentration across countries has changed over 
time. Specifically, the HHI index for each year is calculated as 2( )
c
c
s! where sc represents the 
share of EU international road transport performed by carriers based in country c. We present 
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this measure first for our larger set of 11 member countries, followed by the same measure 
restricted to the six countries for which we have complete time series data. 
 The data in this table confirms that for the EU as a whole, the concentration of the 
international road freight industry has been steadily falling over the time covered by our data. 
This, of course, is not surprising given EU enlargement (see Appendix C for a brief summary).  
When we concentrate on only those six countries for which we have full data, we find a decrease 
in concentration from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, after which concentration increases.  This 
suggests that the carriers of smaller countries, which started off with low shares of international 
road transport, gained share during the deregulation period. But from the mid 1990s, when full 
deregulation had occurred, the larger countries bounced back.  In the end, we conclude that the 
net effect of deregulation on the transport share and intensity of each country, and thus on the 
concentration of the economic activity across countries, has been negligible.  
Table 5. HHI index for international transport in Western Europe 
Year HHI(11) HHI(6) Year HHI(11) HHI(6) 
1982 1929 2096 1993 1305 1921 
1983 1900 2085 1994 1307 1903 
1984 1930 2089 1995 1221 1901 
1985 1946 2096 1996 1225 1956 
1986 1624 2098 1997 1236 1950 
1987 1558 2042 1998 1393 1971 
1988 1596 2085 1999 1173 2014 
1989 1353 2058 2000 1147 1979 
1990 1354 2041 2001 1174 2042 
1991 1326 2003 2002 1189 2043 
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In this paper we have described how the international road freight transport sector was 
deregulated in the European Union throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and we analyzed the effect 
of the deregulation on the industry on the extent and organization of the industry.  
Deregulation in Western Europe was gradual and took place through many channels, 
including the gradual dismantlement of the system of authorizations allocated for international 
road transport, the elimination of border controls, and the lifting of rules concerning cabotage 
(the right to pick up and deliver within a country other than the one in which the carrier is 
registered).  Our results imply that these changes had a large positive effect on the total amount 
of international road transport in the EU, even after controlling for the continuing process of 
economic integration that was occurring there over the same period. We also find that 
deregulation led more firms to rely on for-hire trucking firms for their road transportation needs. 
Both of these results are consistent with the notion that deregulation allowed road freight 
transportation companies to become more efficient and that, as these firms passed the costs 
savings to customers, the extent to which shippers chose to rely on road freight transportation 
increased. Thus we find evidence that deregulation was efficiency enhancing in Europe as it was 
in the United States. 
Finally, we examined how the deregulation of the international trucking sector changed 
the concentration of this activity across EU member countries. We found that the effect of 
deregulation on this aspect of the industry was negligible. This is not a minor point in the context 
of the European Union, where the veto power of countries, coupled with their desire to maintain 
the status quo for their economies, accounts for strong inertia in the decision-making process. 
Such tendency toward inertia can only grow now with the accession of 10 more members in May 
2004.  Our result that in fact the distribution of economic activity in the crucial and quite mobile 
industry that is international road transport should be reassuring to those involved in the 
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development of supranational policy at the EU level and potentially elsewhere as well.
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In Europe, own-account transport was originally defined in the 1957 resolution of the ECMT (European Council of 
the Ministers of Transport). According to this resolution a movement of goods is to be considered transport for own 
account if it is performed by a natural or legal person: 
• Using vehicles either owned by him or put to his exclusive disposal for internal transport movements under 
the conditions laid down in national laws and regulations or in bilateral agreements if it concerns 
international transport. 
• For his own requirement and to move goods either owned by him or sold, bought, borrowed, loaned, let out 
on hire or hired, produced, processed or repaired by him, provided that such transport is ancillary to the 
main activities of the firm. 
Council directive 74/149/EEC published in the OJ L 084 of 28/03/1974 extends the first Council Directive of 23 
July 1962 to own-account transport. However the first directive that defines own-account transport is council 
directive 80/49/EEC published in OJ L 18 24/1/1980, amended by regulation 881/92. It specifies that carriages for 
which the following conditions arise must be exempt from any transport quota or authorization system (see the text 
for more on these as they apply to the for-hire segment): 
• The goods transported are owned by the firm or have been sold, bought let out on hire or hired, produced, 
extracted, processed or repaired by the firm. 
• The purpose of the journey is to carry the goods to or from the firm or to move them for its own requirements. 
• The motor vehicles used are driven by employees of the firm 
• The vehicles carrying the goods are owned by the firm or have been bought by it on deferred terms or hired 
provided that in the latter case they meet the conditions of Council Directive 84/647/EEC of December 19 1984 
(amended by Dir. 90/398/EEC) on the use of vehicles hired without drivers for the carriage of goods by road. 
• Carriage is ancillary to the overall activities of the firm. 
35
Lafontaine and Valeri:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2005
 35 
Appendix B 
Distribution of community quotas over the period 1969 – 1984. Source: Degli Abbati (1987) 
 196941 197342 197543  197844 198045 198246 
Belgium 161 191 265 318 413 434 
Denmark -- 68 169 203 286 305 
Germany 286 321 427 512 689 727 
Greece -- -- -- -- -- 88 
France 286 313 409 491 627 656 
Ireland -- 23 50 60 76 88 
Italy 194 230 319 383 539 567 
Luxembourg 33 45 70 84 106 111 
Netherlands 240 279 382 458 597 626 
UK -- 114 272 326 418 436 
Total 
authorized 1200 1584 2363 2835 3751 4038 
 
Distribution of community quotas over the period 1985 – 1992 
 198547 198648 198749 198850 198950 199051 199152 199252 
Belgium 570 707 1036 1488 2084 2918 4133 5787 
Denmark 469 625 929 1444 2022 2831 4010 5614 
Germany 914 1112 1735 2374 3324 4654 6986 9781 
Greece 131 170 293 658 922 1291 1829 2561 
Spain -- 673 1014 1543 2161 3026 4286 6001 
France 801 957 1488 2018 2826 3957 5604 7846 
Ireland 147 204 341 671 940 1316 1865 2611 
Italy 721 883 1424 2022 2831 3964 5614 7860 
Luxembourg 179 245 404 693 971 1360 1926 2697 
Netherlands 785 955 1553 2104 2946 4125 5842 8179 
Portugal -- 233 416 873 1223 1713 2427 3398 
UK 551 673 902 1265 1771 2480 3512 4917 
Total authorized 5268 7437 11535 17153 24021 33635 48034 67252 
 
                                                
41 Council Reg. 1018/68 in OJ L 175 of 23/7/68. 
42 Council Reg. 2829/72 in OJ L 298 of 31/12/72. The increase was 15% for 1973 and 1974. 
43 Council Reg. 3256/74 in OJ L 349 of 28/12/74.  
44 Council Reg. 3024/77 in OJ L 358 of 31/12/77. 
45 Council Reg. 2963/79 in OJ L 336 of 29/12/79. 
46 Council Reg. 663/82 in OJ L 78 of 24/3/82. A 15% increase for Greece and Ireland and a 5% increase for all other 
member states. 
47 Council Reg. 3621/84 in OJ L 333 of 21/12/84 p. 61 
48 Council Reg. 3677/85 in OJ L 354 of 30/12/85 
49 Council Reg. 1879/87 in OJ L 179 of 3/7/87 
50 Council Reg. 1841/88 in OJ L 163 of 30/6/88 
51 Council Reg. 1053/90 in OJ L 108 of 28/4/90 
52 Council Reg. 3914/90 and 3915/90 in OJ L 375 of 12/1990. Council reg. 3915/90 increases the quotas allocated to 
all countries slightly and to Germany significantly in view of the German unification. 
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Proportion of international freight transport deregulated, 1982-1992, assuming 90% is deregulated in 1992 
and 100% is deregulated starting in 1993. Each cell is [#authorizations(t) / #authorizations(1992)] * 90 
 1982-84 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Belgium 6.75 8.86 11 16.11 23.14 32.41 45.38 64.28 90 
Denmark 4.89 7.52 10.02 14.89 23.15 32.42 45.38 64.29 90 
Germany 6.69 8.41 10.23 15.96 21.84 30.59 42.82 64.28 90 
Greece 3.09 4.6 5.97 10.3 23.12 32.4 45.37 64.28 90 
Spain -- -- 10.09 15.21 23.14 32.41 45.38 64.28 90 
France 7.52 9.19 10.98 17.07 23.15 32.42 45.39 64.28 90 
Ireland 3.03 5.07 7.03 11.75 23.13 32.4 45.36 64.29 90 
Italy 6.49 8.26 10.11 16.31 23.15 32.42 45.39 64.28 90 
Luxembourg 3.7 5.97 8.18 13.48 23.13 32.4 45.38 64.27 90 
Netherlands 6.89 8.64 10.51 17.09 23.15 32.42 45.39 64.28 90 
Portugal -- -- 6.17 11.02 23.12 32.39 45.37 64.28 90 




Proportion of cabotage deregulated, 1990-1998, assuming 90% is deregulated in 1997 and 100% is deregulated 
starting in 1998. 0% is deregulated prior to 1990. Each cell is [#authorizations(t) / #authorizations(1997)] * 90 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Belgium 9.45 19.86 21.86 22.91 38.84 52.74 68.57 90.00 
Denmark 9.45 19.85 21.85 22.91 38.82 52.74 68.58 90.00 
Germany 9.46 19.87 21.87 22.92 38.83 52.75 68.58 90.00 
Greece 9.44 19.83 21.86 22.94 38.78 52.71 68.54 90.00 
Spain 9.46 19.86 21.87 22.92 38.81 52.73 68.57 90.00 
France 9.46 19.87 21.86 22.91 38.83 52.75 68.58 90.00 
Ireland 9.44 19.83 21.84 22.90 38.83 52.76 68.59 90.00 
Italy 9.46 19.87 21.86 22.91 38.84 52.75 68.58 90.00 
Luxembourg 9.45 19.85 21.84 22.88 38.77 52.73 68.56 90.00 
Netherlands 9.46 19.87 25.51 22.91 38.82 52.75 68.58 90.00 
Austria -- -- -- -- -- 0.00 0.00 90.00 
Portugal 9.45 19.84 21.85 22.91 38.84 52.75 68.58 90.00 
Finland -- -- -- -- 8.70 52.71 68.55 90.00 
Sweden -- -- -- -- 13.22 52.73 68.56 90.00 
UK 9.45 19.84 21.84 22.89 38.81 52.15 68.57 90.00 
Liechtenstein -- -- -- -- -- 34.74 67.89 90.00 
Norway -- -- -- -- 20.48 53.17 69.21 90.00 





Distribution of cabotage quotas over the period 1990 – 1998: number of 2-month cabotage authorizations.53 
                                                
53 Commission of the European Communities (2000)  
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 199054 199155 1992 1993 199456,57 199558 19966 1997 1998 59 
Belgium 661 1388.5 1528.5 1602 2715 3687 4794 6292 4090 
Denmark 641 1346.5 1482.5 1554 2634 3578 4653 6106 3969 
Germany 1085 2278.5 2507.5 2628 4452 6047 7862 10318 6707 
Greece 292 613.5 676.5 710 1200 1631 2121 2785 1811 
Spain 685.5 1440 1585.5 1662 2814 3823 4971 6525 4243 
France 896.5 1883 2072.5 2172 3681 5000 6501 8531 5546 
Ireland 297.5 625 688.5 722 1224 1663 2162 2837 1845 
Italy 897.5 1885 2074.5 2174 3685 5005 6507 8539 5552 
Luxembourg 308 647 712 746 1264 1719 2235 2934 1909 
Netherlands 934.5 1962.5 2519 2262 3834 5209 6773 8888 5778 
Austria -- -- -- -- -- 0 0 4256 2767 
Portugal 388.5 816 898.5 942 1597 2169 2820 3701 2406 
Finland -- -- -- -- 296 1794 2333 3063 1992 
Sweden -- -- -- -- 590 2354 3061 4018 2613 
UK 562 1180.5 1299.5 1362 2309 3103 4080 5355 3482 
Liechtenstein -- -- -- -- -- 22 43 57 37 
Norway -- -- -- -- 198 514 669 870 567 
Iceland -- -- -- -- 5 13 17 23 15 
Total 
authorized 7649 16066 17685 18536 32498 47366 61602 85098 55329 
 
                                                
54 Council Reg. 4059/89 in OJ L 390 of 30/12/89, which entered into effect on July 1 1990. This regulation also 
specified that the quota should increase annually starting from July 1 1991, In 1991, 1992 and 1993 the number of 
authorizations increased by 10%. The cabotage increases were allocated linearly.  
55 The increase in the quota on January 1991 accounted for the unification of Germany. See Council Reg. 296/91 in 
OJ L 36 of 08/02/91. 
56 Council Reg. 3118/93 in OJ L 279 of 12/11/93. Regulation 792/94 (in OJ L 92 of 9/4/94) introduced the 
possibility of cabotage for own-account operations, valid from 1/1/1994, that is retroactively. Council Reg. 3118/93 
was amended by Council Reg. 3315/94 published in OJ L 350. The latter regulation accounts for the enlargement of 
the Community to the whole EEA area (except Austria and Switzerland) starting in July 1994. See following note. 
57 The cabotage regime was extended to the whole EEA area (except Austria and Switzerland). See Annex 11 of the 
Decision of the EEA Joint Committee n. 7/94 published in the OJ L 160 of 21/3/94. 
58 Increases in quotas following enlargement of the European Economic Area. The Decision of the EEA Joint 
Committee n. 60/95 published in the OJ L 251 of 3/10/96 defines the allocation of additional cabotage permits. 
59 Cabotage authorizations for 1998 are for the period January 1 to June 30 only. Starting on July 1, 1998 cabotage 
authorizations are no longer required. 
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Appendix C:  Brief history of the enlargement of the EU 
 
 
1957 – The EU (still EEC at this point) is established by the Treaty of Rome. The six founding members 
are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
1973 – Denmark, Ireland and the UK join. 
1981 – Greece joins. 
1986 – Spain and Portugal join 
1990 – Eastern Germany joins through the German reunification process 
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